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OWNED AND CONTROLLED BUSINESSES 

ON TRIBAL RESERVATIONS 

HELEN M. KEMP* 
INTRoDucnoN 
In 1937, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act1 
("NLRA" or "Act") to protect "the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre­
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection."2 The. NLRA does not explicitly state that it applies to 
Indian-owned businesses on or off reservations. Nevertheless, in 
Navajo Tribe v. NLRB,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, basing its holding on an analysis of the policy behind the 
NLRA, interpreted the Act to apply to a private business employ­
• B.A., M.A., J.D., cum laude, Boston University. Associate, Suisman, Shapiro, 
Wool, Brennan and Gray, P.C., New London, cr. 
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1. National Labor Relations Act; ch. 372, § 1,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988». 
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
3. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). 
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ing Indian and non-Indian workers located on a tribal reservation.4 
Since that time, the National Labor Relations, Board ("NLRB" 
or "Board") has been inconsistent in its assertion of jurisdiction 
over tribal employers, basing jurisdiction on considerations such as 
whether the activity is on or off a reservation;5 whether it involves 
only Indians,6 or Indians and non-Indians;7 and whether the tribe or 
another entity controls the labor relations aspects of the enter­
prise.8 These considerations in turn are based on the fluctuating 
themes of "tribal sovereign rights" and tribal self-determination.9 
Consequently, the results 'of these cases have been mixed,' with no 
bright-line rule emerging to guide future decisions. 
Resolutions of the questions of whether the NLRA applies to 
Indian-controlled businesses, and whether the Board should assert 
jurisdiction, are important because of the growth of tribal enter­
prises in a variety of areas. In their quest for economic self-suffi­
ciency, Indian tribal enterprises frequently become the major 
employer in their area, often grossing millions of dollars in annual 
income.lO This Article argues that the NLRA should apply to all 
tribal enterprises, and" more importantly, that the Board should as­
sert jurisdiction over all tribal businesses whether or not they are 
located on or off the reservation so long as: (1) the enterprise is not 
providing or performing a tribal function; (2) the enterprise is not 
providing or'performing a traditional governmental service; and (3) 
the gross annual revenues exceed one million dollars per year. 
Part I of this' Article examines the view that' g~neral federal 
statutes impli~itly apply to Indian tribes. Part I also determines the 
appropriate analysis that should be followed in' applying general . , 
4. See id. at 164-65. . 
5. See Sac and Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992) (business owned by tribe, but 
located off reservation).' , 
6. See Southern Indian Health Council, 290 N.L.R.B. 436 (1988) (non-profit busi­
ness, owned and operated by ~ndians on their reservation). 
7. See Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 163 (1979) (tribal council owned 
51 % of company's stock; company employed over 400 workers of whom 140-170 were 
members of the Tribe). ' 
8. Compare Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976) (tribe controlled 
labor relations; thus, Board refused to assert jurisdiction) with Devils Lake, 243 
N.L.R.B. 163 (private employer controlled labor relations; thus, jurisdiction asserted). 
9. See, e.g., Fort Apache, 226 N.L.R.B. at 506 (tribal governments are "created by 
the Indians themselves as a separate people"). 
10. For example, the Foxwoods Casino, operated by the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe in Connecticut, is earning profits that are projected to reach $600 million in 1994. 
Kirk Johnson, An Indian Tribe's Wealth Leads to the Expansion of Tribal Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 1994, Metro Section, at 1,32. 
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federal statutes to Indian tribes. Part II describes current Board 
decisions as they relate to the assertion of jurisdiction over Indian, 
tribal employers.· Part III argues that interpretation of the NLRA 
and prior Board decisions, in light of the appropriate analysis out­
lined in Part I, leads to the conclusion that the NLRA and Board 
jurisdiction applies to tribal-owned or operated businesses located 
on or off tribal lands. In Part IV, this Article examines various pol­
icy reasons the Board should consider in asserting jurisdiction over 
such enterprises. Finally, in Part V, this Article proposes that be­
cause the NLRB decision to assert jurisdiction is discretionary, it 
should be re-evaluated in light of the changing conditions of Indian 
employment enterprises. 
I. ApPLICABILITY OF GENERAL FEDERAL STATUTES TO 
INDIAN TRIBES 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning 
the principles applicable to determining whether the regulation of 
activities in Indian country is preempted have not been static. 
Although "[f]ederal treaties and statutes have been consistently 
construed to reserve the right of self-government to the tribes,"ll 
recent cases have established a "trend ... away from the idea of 
inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward 
reliance on federal preemption."12 The goal of any preemption in­
quiry is "to determine the congressional plaQ."13 
The right of self government is ultimately dependent on, and 
subject to, the broad powers of Congress, with "tribal sovereignty 
... dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Govern­
ment."14 Most importantly, the Supreme Court has declared that 
"[t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and 
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is 
subject to complete defeasance. "15 "Stressing that Indian tribes can­
not exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sov­
ereigns, the Court ... [has stated] that the Indian tribes have lost 
any 'right of governing every person within their limits except 
11. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 273 (1982 ed.). 
12. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
13. Pennsylvania v.Nelson, 350 U.s. 497, 504 (1956). 
14. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 154 (1980). 
15. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added); see also 
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 177-79 & nn.2, 3, & 5 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., con­
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
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themselves. '''16 
The Indian tribes retain their inherent power to punish tribal 
offenders, determine tribal membership, regulate domestic rela­
tions among members, and prescribe rules of inheritance for mem­
bersY In contrast, "the 'exercise of tribal power beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and 
so cannot survive without express congressional delegation/"18 
It is against this" 'backdrop"'19 that the issue of the applicabil­
ity of federal statutes to Indian tribes must be analyzed. It has been 
settled by many court decisions that a general statute in terms ap:' 
plying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.2o 
Arguably, this holding from Federal Power Commission v. Tusca­
rora Indian Nation 21 is dictum, but it is dictum that has guided 
many court decisions22 in upholding the applIcation of general fed­
eral laws to Indian tribes.23 
In Smart v. State Farm,24 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, citing Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Farm,25 expanded upon the Tuscarora dictum and outlined the 
proper analysis for determining the applicability of a federal statute 
with regard to jurisdiction over Indian tribes. The Smart court em­
ployed the following factors as outlined in Donovan: 
16. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (quoting Oliphant v. Su­
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,209 (1978» (other citation omitted). Although the 
Montana Court acknowledged that "Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority 
in criminal matters," it held in Montana that "the principles on which it relied support 
the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not 
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Id. 
17. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 n.18. 
18. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1993) (quoting Montana, 
450 U.S. at 564) (reaffirming the principle of limited tribal sovereignty). 
19. See white Mountain Apache 1tibe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (quot­
ing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,172 (1973». 
20. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Thscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 
(1960). 
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1111 (1981) (holding that "federal laws generally applicable throughout the 
United States apply with equal force to Indians on reservations"). 
23. See, e.g., Smart V. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
ERISA applicable to tribes); Confederated Tribes V. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983) (holding tribes and their members are subject to fed­
eral excise tax); Fry V. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1011 (1978) (holding Indian logging operations are subject to federal taxes). 
24. 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989). 
25. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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[a] federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the is­
sue of applicability to Indian Tribes may still not apply to them if 
[one of three exceptions is met]: (1) the law touches "exclusive 
rights of self governance in purely intramural matters"; (2) the 
application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights guaran­
teed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof "by legislative his­
tory or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not 
apply to Indians on their reservations."26 . 
Thus, tJ?e proper analysis to follQW in determining the applicability 
of a federal statute with regard to junsdiction over Indian tribes is 
to determine if the statute involved is a general one applying to all 
persons and, if so, to then determine if any of the Donovan excep­
tions are met. 




A. NLRB Decisions Regarding Jurisdiction 
In Navajo Tribe v. NLRB,21 the Navajo Tribe sought an injunc­
tion preventing the NLRB from holding a representation election 
at the Texas Zinc Minerals Corporation ("TZM") mining plant lo­
cated on the Navajo reservation. TZM was a private business em­
ploying both Indian and non-Indian workers.28 
The Navajo Tribe put forth several reasons why the Board 
lacked jurisdiction to conduct an election within Navajo land. First, 
the Tribe argued that it "has plenary authority of self-government 
with respect to the members of its Tribe and as to all activity con­
ducted upon its reservation, except to the extent that the federal 
government has expressly limited such authority."29 The Tribe ar­
gued that this included the right to exclude outsiders.3D Second, the 
Tribe put forth that "pursuant to its power of self-government [it] 
had enacted resolutions forbidding all unionization activities on its 
reservation."3! Third, the Tribe argued that "the [NLRA] was not 
26. Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-33 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 
751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (other citation omitted». 
27. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). 
28. [d. at 163. : The mill employed about 87 persons; 47 were members of the 
Navajo Tribe and 40 were non-Indian. [d. 
29. [d. . . 
30. [d. at 164. The Thbe based this argument on the provisions of the Treaty of 
June 1, 1868, between the Navajo Thbe and the United States Government. [d. (citing 
Theaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, U.S.-Navajo Tribe, 15 Stat. 667). 
31. [d. 
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intended to apply to commerce with an Indian Tribe or resulting 
from business activities located on an Indian reservation."32 In a 
succinct analysis, citing Tuscarora33 but basing its findipgs on analy­
sis of the policy of the NLRA, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the Tribe's arguments and held that the national 
labor policy, subsumed in the NLRA, applied to the employment 
relationship within triballands.34 
The Navajo Tribe decision appeared to have settled the juris­
dictional issue with its broad holding, but the Board h~d a different 
interpretation. In Fort Apache Timber CO.,35 the employer was a 
timber company wholly-owned and operated by the White Moun­
tain Apache Tribe and located within the Apache reservation in Ar­
izona.36 Since the Apache Tribe directed the mill manager, set 
wages and working conditions, and transferred workers among vari­
ous tribal operations,3? the Board found that the Tribe, not the tim­
ber company, was the employer.38 For these reasons, the Board 
declined to assert jurisdiction over the employer.39 
The Board explained that the jurisdiction issue was different 
than that in Navajo Tribe. The Fort Apache decision stated that, in 
Navajo Tribe, "the Board refused to decline assertion of jurisdiction 
over a non-Indian employer who otherwise met the Board's juris­
dictional standards, merely because the company was in part con­
ducting operations on Indian land, which it had leased from the 
tribe."40 In Fort Apache, on the other hand, the Tribe itself was the 
employer. Therefore, the Fort Apache issue was whether the 
NLRA applied to tribal councils as employers.41 
'In Fort Apache, the Board stated that "[ilt is clear that individ­
ual Indians and Indian tribal governments, at least on reservation 
lands, are generally free from state or even in most instances Fed­
eral intervention, unless Congress has specifically provided to the 
contrary."42 This interpretation is in direct opposition to that of the 
32. Id. at 163. 
33. Federal Power Comm'n v. Thscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960). 
For a discussion of Tuscarora, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text . 
. 34. Navajo Tribe, at 165 & n.4. 
35. 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976). 
36. Id. at 503. 
37. Id. at 504. 
38. Id. at 506. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 504 n.4. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 506. 
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Navajo Tribe which re­
jected the Tribe's argument that absent express limitation of Fed­
eral authority, jurisdiction could not be asserted.43 . In any event, 
the Board concluded that because the Tribal Council performed as 
a "government," it was specifically excluded from the NLRA's defi­
nition of employer.44 
. In Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corp. ,~5 the Board c(;m­
fronted another set of similar facts. The employer, Devils Lake, 
was a joint venture between the Sioux. Indian Tribal Council and 
the Brunswick Corporation. The Tribe owned fifty-one percent and 
Brunswick owned forty-$e percent of the employing enterprise 
which was located within the tribal reservation. The union involved 
in Devil's Lake argued that this case could be distinguished from 
Fort Apache because (1) Brunswick, not the Tribal Council, estab­
lished and controlled the enterprise'S labor relations, policies, and 
practices, and (2) the Tribe only owned fifty-one percent of Devils 
Lake, it was not a "wholly owned" tribal enterprise.46 Based upon 
these arguments, the Boar<;i agreed that this case was inapposite to 
Fort Apache and asserted jurisdiction. 
The Board both confirmed and broadened its Fort Apac~e cri­
teria for jurisdiction in Southern Indian Health Council, Inc.47 The 
employer in this case was a health care clinic operated by a consor­
tium of Indian tribes, located on the Barona Indian Reservation in 
San Diego County. It differed, however, from Fort Apache in that a 
board of directors (whose members were appointed by the tribes) 
and not a tribal government had operated the enterprise, "the 
[e]mployer ha[ d] a separate payroll from the tribes[,] and working 
conditions [were] set by the program director and the department 
heads, who [were] not members of the consortium tribes."48 
The Board held that, although the program directors con­
trolled the day-to-day operations, it was the boardof,directors who 
43. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
928 (1961). 
44. Fort Apache, 226 N.L.R.B. at 506. The NLRA provides that governments and 
"political subdivisions" are exempt from the Act. 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1988). The text 
reads in pertinent part: "The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of 
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly 
owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof." Id. . 
45. 243 N.L.R.B. 163 (1979). 
46. Id. at 163. 
47. 290 N.L.R.B. 436 (1988). 
48. Id. at 436-37. 
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established and controlled the "significant employment policies," 
the Directors were controlled by the member tribes, and that the 
separate payroll was not a "significant difference."49 In this case, 
the Board concluded that the consortium of tribes, asserted to be an 
employer, are implicitly exempt as governmental entities within the 
meaning of the Act.50 
The Board policy to this point was arguably the following: the 
Board declined to assert jurisdiction in situations where an Indian 
tribe, and not a private employer; controlled the labor relations as­
pect of the enterprise. Until Southern Indian Health Cou~cil, Inc., 
the Board cases had only dealt with situations where an enterprise 
was located on tribal lands. There had been no case involving a 
situation where an· Indian tribe controlled the empioyment aspect 
of a business located off tribal lands. In Sac and Fox Industries ,51 
this issue was finally addressed. 
Sac and Fox Industries ("SFI") is a 'non-profit corporation 
which the Sac· and Fox Indian Tribe of Oklahoma owns in its en­
tirety. By the end of September 1989, SFI had secured a defense 
department contract worth nearly thirty million dollars.52 In per­
formance of this contract, SFI acquired or opened facilities, off tri­
ballands, in four Oklahoma communities.53 There was little doubt 
in the Board's mind that the Sac and Fox Indian Tribe owned the 
enterprise and controlled the labor relation policies of SFJ.54 The 
issue for the Board was then whether the policies behind Fort 
Apache and Southern Indian were "directly controlling in this case 
where the· subject facilities are located well outside the Tribal 
reservation."55 
The Board revisited Navajo Tribe and determined that the 
NLRA "is a statute of general applicability"56 whose "jurisdictional 
definitions ... are of 'broad and comprehensive scope,' containing 
only a few specified exemptions."57 The Board stated that 
"[n]owhere in the list of exemptions or elsewhere in the statute is 
there any menti~n cif Indians or their off-reservation enterprises. 
49. Id. at 437. 
50. Id. (citing Fort Apache TImber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 n.22 (1976». 
51. 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992). 
52. Id. at 241. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 241-42. 
55. Id. at 243. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (quoting Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961». / 
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Thus, the Tuscarora rule clearly applies."58 The Board then under­
took an analysis utilizing the Donovan exceptions to determine if 
the situation in Sac and Fox met one of the three exceptions 
listed.59 
The Board concluded that asserting jurisdiction would not "in­
terfere with the ... rights of self-government in purely intramural 
matters,"60 the first exception under the Donovan analysis. The 
Board found that SFI was "engaged in a normal manufacturing op­
eration at [the] facilities"61 and that the majority of the employees 
had been previously employed by the non-tribal employer.62 The 
Board also stated that "the NLRA encourages the practice and pro­
cedure of collective bargaining, ... it does not ... actually compel 
any agreement ... nor does it regulate the substantive terms incor­
porated in an agreement."63 Thus, the NLRA would not actually 
usurp the Tribe's decision making powers.64 Finally, purely intra­
mural affairs (tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic 
relations) would not be subject to regulation by the NLRA.65 
As to Donovan's second exception, "[w]hether application of 
the NLRA would 'abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties,"'66 
neither SFI nor the Board could discern any "specific provision in 
any of the numerous treaties that would prohibit application of the 
NLRA" in this situation.67 Lastly, the Board reviewed the legisla­
tive history of the NLRA pursuant to analyzing the third Donovan 
exception-"whether Congress intended the NLRA not to apply to 
an off-reserVation tribal enterprise"-and concluded that Congress 
did not so intend. The current Board noted that their decision in 
Fort Apache had indicated otherwise, but limited that holding to 
58. Id. The Tuscarora rule is in essence "that a general statute in terms applying 
to all persons includes Indians and their property interests." Id. (quoting Federal 
Power Comm'n v. Thscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960)). For a discussion 
of Tuscarora, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
59. Id. at 243-45 (citing Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene lHbal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 
(9th Cir. 1985)). For the Donovan exceptions, see supra note 26 and accompanying 
text. 
60. Id. at 244. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (citing NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952)) (obli­
gation is only to bargain in good fai~h).. 
64. For example, in Warm Springs Forest Prods., No. 36-5889, 1988 WL 228400 
(N.L.R.B.G.C.), the union agreement recognized that tribal members were given hiring 
preference. Id. at *1. 
65. Sac and Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. at 244. 
66. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
67. Id. 
10 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
enterprises located directly on the reservation.68 Even so, the 
Board appeared to "open the door," and impliedly rejected the no­
tion that they would never assert jurisdiction over enterprises on 
reservations.69 
Thus, with its Sac and Fox decision, the Board's policy regard­
ing jurisdiction narrowed to the assertion of jurisdiction in all situa­
tions except where the tribal employer controls the labor relations 
policies of the enterprise and where the enterprise i~ located on 
tribal land. 
B. 	 The "Hawkins Test" and Its Role in the NLRB Decisions 
Regarding Jurisdiction 
Although specifically mentioned in only two of the NLRB de­
cisions regarding tribal employers,70 the "Hawkins Test," which is 
used to determine if the entity involved is a "political subdivision," 
and thus outside the reach of the NLRB, has been an influential 
factor in the NLRB's determination of whether or not to assert ju­
risdiction in cases involving tribal employers. The precise legal is­
sue presented in many of these tribal employer decisions is whether 
a tribal entity is an "employer" within the meaning of section 2 of 
the NLRA and therefore within the NLRB's jurisdiction, or, con., 
versely, whether the tribal entity involved is a "political subdivi­
sion" and thus outside the reach of the NLRB.71 
The term "political subdivision" is not defined in the Act. In 
Hawkins County, the Supreme Court followed the Board's defini­
tion that the term includes those" 'entities that are either (1). cre­
ated directly by the state, as to constitute departments or 
administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by indi­
viduals who are responsible to public officials or the general electo:­
rate."'72 The second part of the "Hawkins Test" requires that "an 
entity ... demonstrate that its policy-making officials have 'direct 
personal accountability' to public officials or to the general 
68. 	 Id. 
69. Id. "Even assuming arguendo that our dissenting colleague is correct that the 
Board would not assert jurisdiction over SFI at such on-reservation facilities, this is not 
a basis for declining jurisdiction over SFI at its_off-reservation Commerce facility." Id. 
70. Id. at 246 (Devaney, dissenting); Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 
504 n.5 (1976). 
71. 	 See supra note 44 for the relevant text of 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1988). 
72. NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 604­
05 (1971) (quoting Brief for Board, at 11). 
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public."73 
The Board first applied the "Hawkins Test" to tribal employers 
in Fort Apache and concluded that a'tribal council which is the gov­
erning body of a tribe is a "[g]overnment both in the usual meaning 
of the word, and as interpreted and applied by Congress, the Exec­
utive and the CourtS."74 Thus, based upon this analysis, the Board 
has routinely exempted tribal owned' and controlled employers 
from their jurisdiction.75 . 
Recently, however, there appeared to be a shift in the Board's 
interpretation of Hawkins County and its dispositive applicability to 
tribal employers. The holding of both Fort Apache Timber Co. 76 
and Southern Indian Health Counci/77 is that tribal enterprises were 
found to be exempt as government entities within the meaning of 
seCtion 2(2) of the Act under the "Hawkins Test." Thus, the con­
trolling issue was simply to determine whether or not the enterprise 
was owned or managed by the tribe in question. Under the "Haw­
kins Test" the actual location of the enterprise did not matter as 
long as the tribe itself owned or controlled the enterprise.7S 
In Sac and Fox, the Board modified the "Hawkins Test" with 
regard to tribal employers. Ownership or management of the en­
terprise by a Tribe was determined to be insufficient by itself to 
preempt Board jurisdiction; rather the actual location of the enter­
prise (i.e., on or off tribal land) became the dispositive issue with 
regard to asserting jurisdiction.79 Thus, the import of the "Hawkins 
73. Cape Girardeau Care Ctr., Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1019 (1986) (quoting Tru­
man Medical Center v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 1981». 
74. Fort Apache, 226 N.L.R.B. at 506 (footnotes omitted). The Board, utilizing 
the "Hawkins Test," concluded "that the Fort Apache Timber Company is an entity 
administered by individuals directly responsible to the Tribal Council ... hence exempt 
as a governmental entity." Id. at n.22. 
75. See, e.g., Southern Indian Health Council, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 436 (1988). The 
Board, citing Fort Apache, determined the Health Council to be "implicitly exempt" 
from the provisions of the Act. In Sac and Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992), the 
majority found tribal employers exempt as a governmental entity only when the tribal 
enterprises were located on the reservation. Id. at 245. 
76. 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976). 
77. 290 N.L.R.B. 436 (1988). 
78. NLRB member Dennis Devaney, dissenting in Sac and Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. 
241, opined that the "Hawkins Test" "focuses on the identity of the party controlling 
the enterprise," id. at 246, and that "[I]imiting this inquiry to enterprises geographically 
located on tribal land does not give sufficient deference to the self government policy." 
Id. 
79. See id. at 245. The majority opinion stated that Sac and Fox was "distinguish­
able" from both Fort Apache and Southern Indian as in those cases "tribal enterprises 
were located on the reservation, a fact repeatedly stressed by the Board in finding that 
12 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
Test" in the decision to assert jurisdiction over tribal employers has 
been eroded with the holding of Sac and Fox. 
III. WHETHER THE NLRA ApPLIES TO INDIAN BUSINESSES. 

LOCATED ON RESERVATIONS OR TRIBAL LANDS 

In Sac and Fox, the dissent concluded that "[f)rom my perspec­
tive it does not make practical sense for the Board to assert jurisdic­
tion with respect to the Commerce, Oklahoma facility when it is not 
asserting jurisdiction over similar facilities with identical ownership 
and control solely on the basis of geographical 10cation."SO 
Although the dissent was arguing that the Board should not assert 
jurisdiction over tribal employers, this reasoning is· equally appro­
priate for the proposition that the Board should assert jurisdiction 
over tribal owned· and controlled enterprises. There is no doubt 
that the NLRA is a general statute; "its jurisdictional provisions, 
and its definitions of 'employer,' 'employee,' and 'commerce' are of 
broad and comprehensive scope. "81 Thus, the Donovan analysis 
should be applied to determine if the NLRA permits the Board to 
assert jurisdiction over tribal employers located on tribal lands. 
A. 	 Jurisdiction over Employers Located on Tribal Lands Would 
Not Touch the Exclusive Rights of Self-Governance in 
Purely Intramural Matu!rs 
In Sac and Fox, the Board concluded, after careful analysis, 
that assertion of jurisdiction over a tribal enterprise located off tri­
ballands did not touch the" 'exclusive rights of self-governance in 
purely intramural matters. "'82 This conclusion, however, did not 
address the issue of jurisdiction over a tribal enterprise located on a 
reservation in which other tribal rights are recognized (e.g.,exclu­
sion of non-Indians from tribal lands). 
It is arguable that later court cases overruled Tuscarora at least 
to the extent that Tuscarora allows Congress to silently infringe on 
sovereign tribal rights to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. In 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,83 the United States Supreme 
the assertion of jurisdiction would interfere with the tribes' powers of internal sover­
eignty." Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted). 
80. Id. at 247 (Devaney, dissenting). 
81. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
928 (1961). See also Sac and Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. at 243. 
82. Sac and Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. at 244 (quoting Donovan V. Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985». 
83. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
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Court recognized that "a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the 
power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands."84 Merrion, how­
ever, can be distinguished as it arose in a context different from the 
one presented by the NLRA. Merrion discussed the tribal power to 
tax non-Indians who enter reservations for commercial purposes. It 
did not address Congress' ability to modify those rights through the 
exercise of its plenary powers. There wa~ no statute,of general ap­
plicability that appeared to modify: the Tribe's sovereign power to 
tax or exclude.85 
Additionally, in Navajo Tribe, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, addressing the issue of the Tribe's right to exclude out­
siders, stated that "[t]he circumstances that the Corporation's plant 
is located on the Navajo Reservation cannot remove it or its em­
ployees-be they Indians or not-from coverage of the Act."86 Fi­
nally, other court decisions have also held that federal statutes of 
general applicability apply to tribal enterprises located on tribal 
lands.87 
B. 	 Application of the NLRA Would Not Abrogate Rights 
Guaranteed by Indian Treaties 
In Sac and Fox, the Board concluded that SFI failed to identify 
any specific provision in any of its treaties with the federal govern­
ment that would preclude them from asserting jurisdiction over the 
enterprise.88 This Article proposes that, even in situations where 
treaties include such provisions, the Board could still assert jurisdic­
tion unless there was a direct conflict between the provision and the 
application of the NLRA by the Board. 
Under the Constitution, a treaty has the same status as an act 
of Congress and that body may, by enactment of a subsequent law, 
abrogate or modify a prior treaty.89 A later statute must be harmo­
nized, to the. extent possible, and ',' 'the intention to abrogate or 
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.' "90 
, 84. Id. at 14l. 
85. 	 Id. at 149-52. 
86. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
928 (1961). . , 
87. See Smart V. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying ER­
ISA); Donovan V. Coeur d'Alene lHbal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying 
OSHA). 	 . , 
88. 	 Sac and Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241, 244 (1992). 
89. See Lone Wolf V. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903); Head Money Cases, 
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). 
90. 	 Menominee lHbe of Indians V. United States, 391 U.S~ 404, 413 (1968) (quot­
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This does not mean, however, that congressional intent may be ig­
nored when it is apparent from both the subject matter and lan­
guage of the statute.91 
There must be a direct, rather than attenuated, conflict to pre­
vent the application of a general federal statute to Indians.92 This 
requirement is reflected in United States Supreme Court decisions 
determining whether the stawte abrogates treaty rights.93 That a 
statute must do more than "modify" a treaty right in order to ex­
empt Indians is evidenced by the fact that on several occasions 
courts have applied general federal statutes to the Indians. Appli­
cation of the NLRA to Indian tribes will have no greater effect on 
treaty rights than does the application of other federal regulatory 
statutes, such as ERISA and OSHA, which the courts have already 
upheld.94 . 
In Navajo Tribe,95 there was a treaty which granted the Tribe 
the right of self-government. The Tribe contended that application 
of the NLRA would conflict with that treaty. The court held that: 
Forceful as [the Tribe's arguments] are, we are constrained to dis­
agree. When the Treaty of 1868 was adopted, tribal control of 
such labor problems as may then have existed on the Tribal Res­
ervation may well have been expected, at least to the exclusion of 
interference by the several States. Since then, however, Congress 
has adopted a national labor poliCy, superseding the local policies 
of the States and the Indian tribes, in all cases to which the Na­
tional Labor Relations Act applies.96 
ing Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 
138, 160 (1934». . 
91. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. (holding that the Eagle ·Protection Act abrogates treaty rights to hunt 
eagles). 
94. See,e.g., Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying 
ERISA to an Indian enterprise); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 
(9th Cir. 1985) (applying OSHA). 
95. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 
(1961). . 
96. Id. at 164 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court also recognizes the exist­
ence of national policy in legislative acts such as the NLRA. See Barrentine V. Arkan­
sas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 735 (1981) ("The national policy favoring 
collective bargaining and industrial self-government was first expressed in the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935."). 
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C. 	 The Legislative History of the NLRA Does Not Indicate that 
Congress Intended the Act Not To Apply 
In Sac and Fox, the Board concluded: 
SFI has not referred us to, and we are not aware of, any discus­
sion whatsoever in the legislative history of the NLRA dealing 
with Indians. Nor is there any basis in the language of the Act 
itself for inferring a [c]ongressional intent to exempt Indians or 
their off-reservation tribal enterprises.97 
While, once again, this conclusion appears limited to situations 
where the enterprise is located off tribal lands, a closer reading indi­
cates that there is nothing in the Act which demonstrates that Con­
gress intended to exempt Indians or their enterprises, on or off the 
reservation. 
In Navajo Tribe, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
stated the following with regards to the Tribe's argument that ab­
sent express limitation of federal authority jurisdiction could not be 
asserted: 
Congress need not cite or purport to rely on all its powers, when 
reliance on a single power is ample to sustain its mandate. Nor is 
its failure to mention its power over commerce with the Indian 
tribes any indication that it intended to narrow its aCtion with 
respect to interstate commerce.98 
This holding by the Court Of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit indicates 
that NLRB jurisdiction over tribal employers need not be expressly 
stated, and that all employers operating on tribal lands are subject 
to the provisions of the NLRA. 
IV. WHY THE BOARD SHOULD ASSERT ,JURISDIcrION OVER 
TRIBAL-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES ON TRIBAL LANDS 
A. 	 Growth of Tribal Enterprise 
Resolution of whether the Board should assert jurisdiction is 
important because of the growth of tribal enterprises in a variety of 
areas. A 1985 directory lists more than five thousand businesses in 
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico; many of 
which are identified as tribal or inter-tribal owned.99 Mississippi's 
Choctaw are the 15th largest employer in the state, having built a 
97. 	 Sac and Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1992). 
98. 	 Navajo Tribe, 288 F.2d at 165. 
99. LACoURSE COMMUNICATION CORP., THE RED PAGES: BUSINESS ACROSS IN­
DIAN AMERICA (1985). 
16 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
half dozen factories since 1979.100 In 1989, SFI, a corporation 
wholly owned by the Sac and Fox Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, held a 
thirty million dollar defense department contract for the manufac­
ture of chemical resistant suitS.101 
Maine's Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes are engaged in 
leveraged buy-outs of corporations.102 In 1980, the Maine tribes re­
ceived compensation of $81.5· million for the loss of· about two­
thirds of the land which comprises the state of Maine, through a 
series of illegal transactions extending over the course of 200 
years.103 "With the help ()f investment bankers, the Tribes ... par­
lay[ed] the money into factories on their reserv~tions, as well as off­
reservation cement plants, radio stations[,] and a food processing 
company."l04 Their example encouraged the eastern band of Cher­
okees in North Carolina to purchase a thirty million dollar mirror 
manufacturing plant105 which today is the country's largest mirror . . 
manufacturing facility.106 "Similarly, the Lac du Flambeau Chip­
pewa tribe in Wisconsin bought a [twenty-four million dollar] elec­
tronics company that was threatening to" leave the area.107 
A recent article on tribal economic development cites other ex­
amples "of Indian political power successfully evolving into eco­
nomic power."108 The Quinault, Lummi, Swinomish, and· other 
tribes own and operate fish canneries in the Northwest .and 
Alaska.109 The Blackfeet are "a major player in the market for 
writing instruments."llo The Oneidas, Gilas and other tribes own 
and operate office and industrial parks which serve major cities.lli 
Southern California tribes are "embracing lucrative businesses"1l2 
from campgrounds to sand and gravel operations.113 Similarly, 
100. James McGregor, A Quiet Uprising: Indian Tribes Fight Dependency with 
the Weapons of Capitalism, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 1, 1987, at 1B, 4B. 
101. Sac and Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. at 24l. 




106. ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL ASSETS 271 (1990). 
107. McGregor, supra note 100. 
108. John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of 
Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 499 (1991). 
109. Id. at 500. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Alan Abrahamson, Tribes' Immunity Sparks Criticism, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 
1991, at A3. 
113. Id. The Morongo Thbe (900 members) near Banning has an annual net rev­
enue of nearly $1 million from bingo and a sand and gravel operation; the Sycuan Tribe 
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many tribes gross millions of dollars in annual income from a vari­
ety of agriculture and logging operations.114 
It is in the area of large stakes gambling, however, that tribes 
are entering into the economic mainstream. The Mashantucket Pe­
quot Indian Tribe in Connecticut employs approximately 8350 peo­
ple in its gaming enterprise, making the Tribe "one of the biggest 
private employers in the state."115 The Mashantucket Pequot gam­
ing enterprise has a projected annual employment payroll of be­
tween thirty-five and forty million dollars.116. 
In Michigan, the Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa Tribe's two casinos 
employ 3000 people.117 When the K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base 
closes in 1995, the Chippewa Tribe will be the largest employer in 
Michigan's Upper Peninsula.118 Through its casino profits, the 
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe owns a construction company, a bookkeep­
ing business, a janitorial service, two convenience stores, three ho­
tels, shares in a new shopping mall, an auto parts factory, and a 
hotel supply business.119 
To be sure, not all Indian businesses are profitable. Some 
tribes have had motives other than profit in conducting enterprises 
such as improving the economic and social conditions of the people 
of the reservations.12o Others have tribal policies that distribute 
profits directly to tribal members rather than reinvesting them in 
near EI Cajon, (96 members) averages a $300,000 monthly profit from its gaming enter­
prise; the Chemehuevi Tribe (500 members) near Lake Havasu, grosses $4 million in 
annual revenue from the operation of its resort; and the La Jolla Tribe (500 members), 
north of Escondido, has an annual budget of $1.2 million to operate its campground, 
water slide, and general store. Id. 
114. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIANS 40-42 (1984). The Bu­
reau of Indian Affairs has collected statistics on such businesses. The Gila River Indian 
Community in Arizona "has 63,000 acres of irrigated farm land, which averages about 
$17 million in annual gross sales." Id. at 40. The "Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine used 
$2.1 million ... from a land cIainls settlement to purchase a 5,800-acre blueberry farm. 
In the three years the Tribe has owned the land, it has harvested a $4.3 million return 
from the berries sold." Id. at 41. "The Colorado River Indian Tribes in Arizona oper­
ate a 6,200-acre farm enterprise which grosses about $3 million annual income." Id. at 
42. 
115. See Johnson, supra note 10. 
116. Nathan Cobb, Betting on the Future for the Mashantucket Pequots of South­
eastern Connecticut, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1992, Sunday Magazine, at 14. 
117. TIna Lam, Expansion Is Spreading: Hotels and Golf Courses Are on the Table 
for Thriving Reservations, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 1993, at 4F. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See generally Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
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the businesses or into additional ventures.121 In addition, some In­
dian businesses "failed because of mismanagement and interference 
from tribal politicians."122 However, having a policy which requires 
gross operating revenues of one million dollars or more before ju­
risdiction can be asserted will act as an economic yardstick to sepa­
rate profitable businesses from those being poorly operated. 
B. 	 Employees of Indian Businesses Have No Guaranteed Right 
to Collective Bargaining . 
As tribal nations develop economically, they will continue to 
create more employment opportunities and, thus, more opportuni­
ties for employment and labor disputes. Tribal employees, how­
ever, seem to have no right to collective bargaining on either a 
tribal level or under state or federal statutes, unless the Board as­
serts jurisdiction over the enterprise. 
Section 2(2) of the NLRA exempts the "United States ... or 
any State or political subdivision thereof' from the list of employers 
under the Act.123 Since Fort Apache, the NLRB, utilizing the 
"Hawkins Test," has considered Indian tribal councils as being 
analogous to "governments," and has refused in many cases to as­
sert jurisdiction over tribal employers.124 The significance of the 
political subdivision exemption with regard to Indian tribal employ­
ers is that unlike their state and federal COUI;lterparts, there is no 
guarantee of full collective bargaining rights. for Indian tribal 
employees. 
It i~ well settled that employees of an exempt governmental 
entity are not protected by the NLRA due to section 2(2) which 
provides that governments and political· subdivisions are exempt 
from the ACt.125 When worlcers are classified as "public" employ­
ees, their rights are no longer governed by the NLRA, but are, in­
121. See McGregor, supra note 100. Maine's Penobscot and Passamaquoddy 
Tribes discontinued their usual practice of distributing land settlement money to tribal 
members, and instead-with the help of investment bankers-purchased factories and 
businesses. [d. at IB, 4B. 
122. [d. The Oglala Sioux Tribe (Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota), with 
an estimated unemployment rate of 85%, had a history of failed private enterprise. 
"Factories that made such products as fishing lures and moccasins failed because of 
mismanagement and interference from tribal politicians." [d. 
123. 	 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). . 
124. In Fort Apache, the Board stated that "the governing body on the reserva­
tion-isa government both in the usual meaning of the word, and as interpreted and 
applied by Congress, the Executive and the Courts." Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 
N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
125. 	 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
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stead, controlled by state and federal labor policy.126 
Consequently, the basis for public employee bargaining rights is a 
statutory one. 
Federal employees can now exercise collective bargaining 
rights under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.127 
The majority of states have granted, through their political 
processes, full bargaining rights for public employees.128 The diffi­
cultyarises because Indian tribes, as sovereign governments, have 
been exempted from most federal and state employment laws.129 
From these exemptions, it appears that employees who work in 
businesses owned or controlled by Indian tribes can only receive 
employment protection through actions brought under the Indian 
Civil Rights Act ("ICRA")130 which requires that tribes afford 
equal protection and due process rights to people in their em­
ploy.l3l Alternatively, protection may be formally offered through 
tribal laws or informally through a business' personnel policies or 
procedures.132 Some tribes have instituted personnel policies and 
126. See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 
465 (1979).. 
127. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
128. Most public employee collective bargaining laws are modeled after or are 
very similar to Section 8(d) of the NLRA. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309 (West 
1981 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423:215 (West 1978); N.Y. CIv. SERVo 
LAW § 200 (M~Kinney 1983). A non-inclusive list of states allowing collective bargain­
ing is the following: Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Ha­
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
129. TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (1988), expressly 
excludes Indian tribes from the definition of employers who may not discriminate. 
§ 2000e(b). The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 
1992), also excludes Indian tribes from its definition of "employer." § 12111(5)(B). In 
addition to those statutes which expressly exclude Indian tribes in their definition of 
employer, courts and other adjudicatory bodies have held that the following statutes did 
not apply to Indian tribes: Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1988) (mini­
mum wage and hour laws), Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, 4 
F3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 141-187 
(1988), Roberson v. Confederated Tribes, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2749 (1980); Fort 
Apache TImber Co.; 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976). The courts are apparently divided on 
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), con­
tains such an exclusion. Compare EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 
1989) (excluding Indian tribes) with Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. 
Supp. 753 (D.N.D. 1989) (distinguishing situations with nonmember employees). 
130. 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1341 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
131. [d. 
132. However, such personnel manuals must be examined to determine if they 
waive the sovereign immunity of the tribe. That statements in personnel manuals may 
bind a tribe has analogy in federal and state law under which personnel manuals may 
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procedures in tribal codes or manuals that state standards to whiCh 
employees will be held, define behavior that warrants discipline, 
and set out procedures under which employees can address deci­
sions they believe unfair or unwarranted.133 
The difficulty arises because formal "employee-grievance" ac­
tions are heard in tribal courts or forums.134 Unfortunately, many 
ICRA suits are dismissed by tribal courts and aggrieved tribal em­
ployees find themselves either with no forum or with a forum they 
perceive as biased.135 "Bias" is perceived because, in most of the 
employment suits brought against tribes by employees who allege 
violations of employment policies, tribal forums are often con­
fronted by and sustain the defense of sovereign immunity, thus rul­
ing against the employee no matter how valid the grievance.136 
Employees who work for Indian tribes, either for a wholly­
owned tribal business or for a business jointly-owned with a private 
corporation, fall into a "no-man's land" where their labor and col­
lective bargaining rights are governed by neither the NLRA nor by 
state or federal law. A review of ICRA, tribal personnel policies, 
create due process and contract rights in employment. Compare Thrtle Mountain Band 
of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, 1 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-95 (Thrtle Mountain Ct. App. 
1979) (manual had waived immunity of tribe in employment lawsuit) with Moses v. 
Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51, A-53 (Sauk-Suittle Tribal Ct. '1980) (absent express 
waiver, manual did not waive sovereign immunity); see also Guardipee v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Comm'n of Or., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6111 (Grand Ronde 
Tribal Ct. 1992) (provision allowing appeal still did not waive sovereign immunity from 
a claim for back wages). 
133. See, e.g., NAVAJ() TRIB. CoDE tit. 2 app. (1977 & Supp. 1982-83). These 
types of codes are called "Preference in Employment Codes" and are discussed in more 
detail infra, Part IV, Section D. 
134. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (holding that "[t]ribal 
forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA"). 
135. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy ofAdjudication in Tri­
bal Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 
N.M. L. REV. 49, 65 (1988). Pommersheim views the tribal courts as using "the shield of 
sovereign immunity" to such an extent in these cases that the use of the tribal forum 
"prevents any resolution of claims involving individual rights on their merits and fur­
ther inhibits the growth of legitimacy." Id. at 86. 
136. Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program) 
6039, 6041 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1983) (in employment suit against tribal official, tribal 
court held that ICRA "does not affect the, plain language of the tribe's sovereign immu­
nity as a matter of tribal law"). For similar reasoning in employment suits, see also 
Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6148 (Thitle 
Mountain nibal Ct. 1991); Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reserva­
tion, 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6055 (Warm Springs Tribal 
Ct. 1990); Dupree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. 
Training Program) 6106 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1988). . 
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and tribal "preference in employment" codes137 indicates that tribal 
employers have virtually ignored the rights of tribal employees, In­
dian or otherwise, to organize, to bargain collectively, to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of their employment, and, most impor­
tantly, to provide access to impartial determinations of controver­
sies and grievances. 
Rather than guaranteeing such basic rights, tribal employers 
often exhibit anti-union animus138 and retaliate against employees 
who attempt to organize139 or who participate in economic 
strikes.l40 In addition, even in situations where tribal employers 
137. "Preference in employment" codes are general labor codes which require 
employers to give preference in hiring to members of the tribe, develop job descrip­
tions, establish wage rates, etc. See, e.g., 15 NAVAJO TRIB. CODE, Title 601-619 (Supp. 
1984-85, (general labor code). See also Section IV of Vicki J. Limas, Employment Suits 
Against Indian Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DENY. U.L. 
REV. 359, 385 (1993). 
138. In Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, the Tribe, "pursuant to its power of self-govern­
ment, had enacted resolutions forbidding all unionization activities on its reservation." 
288 F.2d 162, 163 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). 
139. See Toiyabe Indian Health Project, No. 31-19604, 1993 WL 255247 
(N.L.R.B.G.C. May 28, 1993). In Toiyabe, the employer was wholly owned and oper­
ated by a consortium of seven Indian tribes and two Indian groups not yet given recog­
nition by the federal government. Id. at *l. "Victoria Dubiel was employed by Toiyabe 
as a dental hygienist and was president of United Toiyabe Employees Association, an 
organization that sought" recognition as the exclusive bargaining representative of 
Toiyabe's employee." Id. In 1992, Dubiel was discharged from her position at Toiyabe 
and filed NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (3) charges, "alleging that Toiyabe discharged her be­
cause of her protected concerted activities on behalf of United Toiyabe Employees As­
sociation." Id. The Region concluded that, if the Board had jurisdiction, the instant 
charge had merit. Id. The Associate General Counsel determined that toiyabe was 
exempt as an employer within the meaning of the Act. Id. at *2. See also Nielsons, Inc. 
and Navajo Eng'g Constr. Auth., No. 28-7410, 1983 WL 29421 (N.L.R.B.G.C. June 23, 
1983). In this case, the Region determined that if jurisdiction could be asserted, then 
the discharge of the charging party, LaLora C. Roy was violative of § 8(a)(I). Id. at *1 
n.l. The Counsel in this case also held that jurisdiction should not be asserted. Id. at 
*3. 
140. Warm Springs Forest Prods., No. 36-5889, 1988 WL 228400 (N.L.R.B.G.C. 
Dec. 23, 1988). In this case, the enterprise was wholly owned by the Warm Springs 
Tribe of Oregon and located on their reservation. Id. at *l. "In 1969, the employer 
recognized the union following a Board-conducted election pursuant to an Agreement 
for Consent Election." Id. at *2. The labor agreement expired "[o]n June 30, 1988 and 
on August 8, 1988, the Union began an economic strike against the [e]mployer. Pickets 
were located at the two entrances to the mill. Several times during the day, tribal police 
came to the scene and told the pickets that they were creating a safety hazard and that 
they should leave. By the end of the day, the police had arrested three of the Indian 
pickets...." Id. The non-Indian pickets were cited and excluded from the reservation, 
pursuant to a tribal ordinance adopted by the tribal council. The Union filed a charge, 
alleging the Employer had violated § 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act in certain respects. 
Id. It was concluded that NLRB jurisdiction should not be asserted over the employer 
because it was owned and controlled by the tribal council of an Indian tribe. Id. 
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recognize and bargain with a union for a number of years, at any 
given time and without notice, the tribal employer may assert juris­
dictional issues and simply_ refuse to bargain over subsequent 
agreements.141 
C. 	 Asserting Jurisdiction Would Effect and Further the Purpose 
of the Act 
When Congress enacted the National Labor R~lations Act,142 
it specifically indicated that "[t]he denial by some employers of the 
right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers 
to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and 
other forms of industrial strife or unrest."143 Congress also de­
clared that it was the policy of the United States to alleviate these 
problems "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full free­
dom of association, self-organization, and designation of represent­
atives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection."l44 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged 
the propriety of this theme when it sustained the constitutionality of 
the NLRA: 
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said 
that they were orgariized out of the necessities of the situation; 
that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; 
that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the main­
tenance of himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay 
him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to 
leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that 
141. Id. In Warm Springs, the Union argued that although the employer was an 
Indian tribe, it was estopped from asserting that the Board lacked jurisdiction because it 
had recognized and bargained with the union for 20 years, pursuant to the Board's 
certification of the union. The Counsel "note[d] that the general rule is that the estop­
pel theory does not operate to preclude the intended beneficiary of the statutory provi­
sion from asserting their rights thereunder," id., and thus the employer was not 
estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction at any time. Counsel noted that where 
"there is no statutory jurisdiction, estoppel cannot be used to vest the Board with juris­
diction that it does not have." Id. 
142. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The NLRA, as amended by the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and 
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 
§ 101 (d)-(e); 73 Stat. 519, 525 (1959), is set forth in 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993). 
143. 	 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
144. 	 Id. 
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union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an 
equality with their employer.145 
There exists a dearth of information available as to what the 
employees of tribal enterprises were seeking with regard to wages 
or terms and conditions of work when they sought union represen­
tation. In Sac and Fox, SFI did not yet offer its employees any life 
or health insurance, retirement plans, vacations,or other kinds of 
fringe benefits146 which may have been a factor in the employees' 
attempt for union representation. In Nielsons, Inc. and Navajo En­
gineering and Construction Authority ("NECA"), it was noted that 
at least on one occasion, NECA had reduced the employees' wage 
rate.147 From these examples, it is argued that these employees 
were simply seeking the basic NLRA right' to influence their 
wages,l48 hours, and employment conditions149 through the collec­
tive bargaining process. . . . 
The policy behind the Act becomes the impetus for asserting 
jurisdiction over tribal employers whether or not the enterprise is 
located on or off the reservation. While the tribal court forum pro­
vides a mechanism for employee grievances, a tribe that values 
profits more than economic parity may not allow bargaining as en­
visioned under the Act.15o Therefore, the current "tribal forum" 
145. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 33 (1937). 
146. Sac and Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241, 242 n.9 (1992). 
147. Nielsons, Inc. and Navajo Eng'g Constr. Auth., No. 28-7410, 1983 WL 29421 
(N.L.R.B.G.C. June 23, 1983). . 
148. With regard to the employees at the Foxwoods Casino, Local 217 of the Ho­
tel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, maintains the two issues are 
wages and job protection. According to Warren Heyman, an organizer for the. union, a 
starting bartender at Foxwoods makes $7.50 an hour, more than a dollar less than his 
Atlantic City counterpart. The Atlantic City bartender can expect his salary to increase 
62% in three years. No such guarantee exists at Foxwoods. See S.G. ~ite, House 
Rules: Are Employees Getting a Fair Deal at FoxwoodS Casino? THE HARTFORD ADvo· 
CATE, Dec. 2, 1993, at 8. 
149. At the Foxwoods Casino, there have been reports of not one, but two, preg­
nant workers who had their water break while working their shift at the casino because 
management refused to relieve them from their post stating they did not have anyone to 
"cover" them. [d. A former employee stated that she had trouble even getting the 
casino to acknowledge that she was being let go. She was simply told not to come 
around anymore. It was reported she said, "I want to see my records," and they said, 
"[y]ou can't see those records, this is a sovereign nation." [d. 
150. Indians who profit from reservation businesses may be more interested in 
retaining those profits than with bargaining wages. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 (1977), the Court noted that members of a minority do not necessarily protect the 
best interests of other people of the same minority. The Court found intentional dis­
crimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury selection in a county in which 
three of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-Americans. [d. at 499-500. 
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system provides inadequate protection for employees of Indian 
businesses. 
D. 	 Tribal "Preference in Employment" Codes and Private 
Enterprise Contracts 
Another concern with the NLRB's refusal to assert jurisdiction 
involves situations in which a non-Indian corporation contracts with 
an Indian tribe for the production of parts, components or other 
goods. This area has expanded in recent years and is likely to ex­
pand even further in the near future. 
In the late 1970s, hoping to cut costs and compete with the 
Japanese, General Motors' Packard Electric Division accepted an 
invitation from the Mississippi Choctaw Tribe to open a plant on 
the Choctaw's reservation.151 "In 1979, a tribal-owned factory, fi­
nanced with federal loans and grants, opened to make auto wiring 
systems for Packard Electric."152 Two years later, a greeting card 
factory opened. This was followed by two more auto wire facilities 
and plants which manufacture stereo speakers for cars and elec­
tronic circuit boards.153 By 1987, Oklahoma's Cherokee Tribe was 
making Circuit boards for IBM; Arizona's Navajo Tribe was assem­
bling electronic parts for General Dynamics; and North Dakota's 
Chippewa and Sioux Tribes were manufacturing trailers, camou­
flage nets, and helmets for the army.154 
The NLRB's policy is to decline jurisdiction over "joint em­
ployers" comprised of a private employer and a public employer. 
Joint employers are those who share control over basic bargaining 
subjects so that meaningful bargaining cannot take place without 
the presence of each.155 The Board has declined to assert jurisdic­
tion in those circumstances where a private employer's labor rela­
tions policy is so controlled by an exempt institution that effective 
collective bargaining has been precluded.156 
This policy has been extended to tribal employers who control 
the labor relations policy of otherwise private employers located on 
tribal lands.157 This Article maintains, however, that such a policy 
15l. 	 McGregor, supra note 100. 
152. 	 Id. 
153. 	 Id. 
154. 	 Id. 
155. 	 See Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670 (1986) and cases cited therein. 
156. 	 Id. 
157. See Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
928 (1961); Fort Apache TImber Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976). In Navajo Tribe, the 
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is ineffectual in light of present contractual practices between In­
dian tribes and private employers, or subcontractors, and thus it 
should be revised. Companies who wish to contract, or subcontract, 
with Indian tribes must very often deal with a tribal "Preference in 
Employment Code" ("PEC") which establishes prevailing wage 
rates, preferences in employment and other requirements applica­
ble to employers on triballands.158 In essence, these codes require 
that employers who wish to employ persons (both Indian and non­
Indian) within tribal lands give labor relations control to the tribe 
upon whose land the enterprise is located. 
Because of the control retained by the tribe under these PECs, 
it is doubtful that the Board would exercise jurisdiction over these 
businesses under the Navajo Tribe-Fort Apache Timber standard.159 
The overriding consideration with regard to joint enterprises is 
which entity controls and establishes labor relations practices and 
policies. It is arguable that under PEC contracts, the labor relations 
NLRB could assert jurisdiction over a private employer on tribal land as long as the 
tribe did not control the employer's labor relations policy. Navajo Tribe, 288 F.2d at 
164. On tribal land, however, where the tribe controls the labor relations policy of the 
private employer, the Board would decline to assert jurisdiction. Fort Apache, 226 
N.L.R.B. at 506. 
158. The "Navajo Preference in Employment Act" ("NPEA") is typical. The 
NPEA was adopted on August 1, 1985 by Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CAU-63-85 
and codified at 15 NAVAJO TRIB. Cm)E tit. 601-619 (Supp. 1984-85). NPEA is a general 
labor code that supplanted the Navajo Nation labor policy adopted in 1958. It provides 
for Navajo supervisors to determine working schedules and to transfer and terminate 
employees. It also provides for an appeal procedure for adverse actions against em­
ployees which culminates in a hearing before a grievance committee, composed in actu­
ality, of Navajo tribal members. [d. 
Over 100 tribes including the Sioux, the Chickasaw, the Cheyenne, the Comanche, 
the Creek and the Choctaw enforce employment laws and ordinances similar to the 
NPEA. See, e.g., LAW AND ORDER OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER Sioux, ch. VIII, § 1-8-4 
(1978); CHOCTAW TRIBAL CoDE, ch. 5, § 1-5-4 (1981); LAW AND ORDER CoDE OF THE 
CHIPPEWA-CREE TRIBE, ch. 3, § 3.3 (1987). For more information with regard to tribal 
codes, see INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R. Johnson, ed. 1988); see also National Indian Law 
Library, Boulder, Colorado (microfiche collection) which was used by Johnson as a ­
basis for' his work. 
159. One interesting jurisdictional aside concerns the "prevailing wage" rates es­
tablished by many tribal employers. In recent cases, courts have held that the NLRA 
may preempt state and local government enactments that provide for the establishment 
and payment of prevailing wage rates usually at construction job sites within their juris­
diction. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F. Supp. 1537,1544 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (holding that negotiation of wage rates is a mandatory subject of bargaining 
under NLRA and state intederence with this process also intederes with the § 7 rights 
of employees); see also Bechtel Constr., Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 812 F.2d 
1220 (9th Cir. 1987). It is thus arguable that as the NLRB has equated a tribal council to 
a "government" that Indian "prevailing wage" laws may also be preempted by federal 
labor laws as embodied in the NLRA. 
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policies and practices are essentially controlled by the tribe, and, 
thus, the Fort Apache standard would always apply. While there is 
no evidence to indicate that private employers contract with Indian 
tribes to avoid the payment of union wages, the processing of griev­
ances and the transactional costs of bargaining may become a con­
cern when economic pressure to cut costs is present. 
This issue of the jurisdiction of the Board over "joint ventures" 
will be of even greater importance in the future. Section 13321 of 
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993160 is designed to provide 
significant tax incentives for businesses that operate on Indian res­
ervations. Under the new tax law, depreciable property used in 
connection with certain trades or businesses located on Indian res­
ervations and placed into service on or after January 1, 1994,161 and 
before December 31, 2003, will be eligible for accelerated deprecia­
tion value.162 
v. UNDER THE "HA WKINS TEST" THE BOARD's DECISION To 
ASSERT JURISDICTION Is DISCRETIONARY AND MAY BE 
CHANGED To REFLECT CHANGING CONDITIONS OR To 
EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT 
This Article maintains that the NLRB's decision not to assert 
jurisdiction over Indian employers on tribal lands is discretionary 
and not statutory163 and as such, the Board, to effect the purposes 
of the Act, should depart from its previously established guidelines 
with regard to Indian employers. The Supreme Court "has consist­
ently declared that in passing the National Labor Relations Act, 
Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdic­
tional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce 
Clause."164 The Board's rulings on its own statutory jurisdiction are 
entitled to great weight165 and it is allowed broad discretion in 
choosing whether or not to exercise its statutory jurisdiction.166 
160. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13321, 107 Stat. 558 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 168(j) 
(Supp. V 1993». 
161. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (Supp. V 1993). 
162. § 1680)(8). 
163. See 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1988). Congress particularly excepted some employ­
ers, e.g., "any State, or political subdivision thereof." Id. These are the statutory ex­
ceptions. The Board also has discretion to decline or assert jurisdiction, where the 
purposes of the Act would be furthered. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1988). 
164. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224,226 (1963); see also NLRB 
v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 575 (7th Cir. 1980). 
165. NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1947). 
166. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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The Board's policy of declining jurisdiction over tribal-con­
trolled enterprises on tribal lands is a discretionary limitation on the 
Board's jurisdiction. The Board should treat similar cases in a simi­
lar manner,167 but it may depart from previously established guide­
lines when to do so will, in the Board's judgment, effect the purpose 
of the Act.t68 As an administrative agency, the Board is allowed 
substantial flexibility to adapt its standards to changing condi­
tions.169 It is not an abuse of discretion for the Board to change its 
policy with respect to matters within its jurisdiction.170 As tribal 
enterprises become economically competitlve,171 it becomes a mat­
ter of fairness and equity to regulate such enterprises according to 
the same government regulation as non-tribal employers. This 
would allow businesses of a similar nature to compete on a "level 
playing field"l72 with regard to operational and transactional 
costs-including all costs concerning labor relations.173 
CONCLUSION 
The NLRA is a general statute which applies to Indian busi­
nesses on reservations. This interpretation both effects the broad 
purposes of the Act and is consistent with the Donovan exceptions. 
The changing conditions with regard to tribal enterprises, the in­
stances of blatant anti-union animus and retaliatory behavior by In­
dian tribes, and the erosion of the validity of the "Hawkins Test" 
with regard to Board decision-making in this area, necessitate that 
167. Id. 
168. See NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1978). 
169. Id. 
170. NLRB v. Kent County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 590 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 
1978). 
171. For example, the Foxwoods Casino operated by the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe, is earning profits that are projected to reach $600 million in 1994. See Johnson, 
supra note 10, at 1, 32. 
172. David Lightman, Indian Gaming Issues Becoming More Work for Lobbyists, 
THE HARTFORD CoURANT, Oct. 10, 1993, at A1 (quoting Roger J. Stone). Roger J. 
Stone served as counsel for Donald Trump at congressional hearings before the House 
Native Americans Affairs subcommittee. Stone made the following statement: '''we 
want a level playing field. The Indian casinos should get the same level of scrutiny, the 
same tax rates, the same law enforcement as everyone else.'" Id. 
173. Analogous to the present situation, it has been NLRB policy not to allow 
commercial enterprises owned by foreign governments to gain an advantage in compet­
ing with private sector companies. See State Bank of India, 273 N.L.R.B. 267 (1984), 
enforced, 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). With regard 
to Indian tribes, the Board in Sac and Fox Indus., has declined to endorse the proposi­
tion that "unlike foreign governments, Indian tribes are entitled to an advantage in 
competing with private companies." 307 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1992). 
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the Board re-evaluate its position with regard to the assertion of 
jurisdiction over tribal employers. Congress did not intend to make 
tribal members "supercitizens" who CQuid trade and interact in in­
terstate commerce free from all but self-imposed regulation. Board 
jurisdiction will enable both employer and employee to diffuse and 
resolve disputes in a neutral arena and its jurisdiction will not im­
pair any rights granted or reserved by federal law. 
